

SOME FURTHER REMARKS ON THE CORE STRUCTURE OF THE ASSIGNMENT GAME

By

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ABSTRACT

The existent theoretic results for the Assignment Game disregard the possible existence of more than one optimal matching and only concentrate on the payoffs of the players. This yields some gap in the theory, concerning the situations where the number of the stable payoffs really matters. We show that if there is only one optimal matching then the core has infinitely many payoffs, so it is a complete lattice with two extreme points. Consequently, every unitary core has more than one optimal matching.