

MS MACHIAVELLI AND THE STABLE MATCHING PROBLEM

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Abstract

This paper is a sequel to a paper, “Machiavelli and the Gale-Shapley Algorithm”, written by Dubins and Freedman [1] in 1981. That paper was, in turn, a sequel to “College admissions and the Stability of Marriage”, by Gale and Shapley [2], 1962. For the benefit of readers who may have missed the previous installments, a brief recapitulation is given in the following section.

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